Public Service Motivation, Task, and Non-task Behavior: A Performance Appraisal Experiment with Korean MPA and MBA Students

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ABSTRACT: Appraisals of public employees are important for a host of reasons, and particularly so with the increasing emphasis on pay-for-performance systems and performance-based management in the public sector. However, managerial appraisals of employees can be somewhat subjective and our understanding of the appraisal process in the public sector is largely U.S.-centric. In this study, we explore whether characteristics of managers, like a rater's public service motivation (PSM), affect appraisal outcomes for their subordinates. Using a mixed experimental design, we analyze these dynamics in a non-U.S. context with MBA and MPA students enrolled in one of Korea's top universities. We find that rater PSM moderates the influence of both task and non-task behavior on an employee's performance appraisal.
INTRODUCTION

The performance appraisals of public employees are important for a host of reasons. Managers use appraisals to determine an employee’s salary increase or lack thereof. Appraisals are used to assess the employee’s potential for promotion within the organization. Performance appraisals are generally included in an employee’s file and follow them throughout their careers. Appraisals can even have a motivating effect that is beneficial to both employees and their organization (Anderfuhren-Biget et al. 2011). As such, performance appraisals are tools to ensure public value, including the effective expenditure of public resources. The increasing emphasis on pay-for-performance systems and performance-based management systems in the public sector make employee evaluations particularly relevant in today’s public employment context (e.g., Kellough and Lu 1993; Lee and Jimenez 2011). While objective appraisals would be ideal, especially considering their importance, recent public agency research suggests evidence of rater subjectivity. In their study of 360-degree performance appraisals, Hassan and Rohrbaugh (2011) found that performance appraisals were likely to be incongruent between managers, subordinates, and employees.

In this study, we therefore seek to expand both our understanding of: (1) the appraisal process, including the role of individual rater attributes, and (2) the contexts in which appraisals occur. More specifically, we explore whether personal characteristics of managers, like their public service motivation (PSM), affect appraisal outcomes for their subordinates. Using a mixed experimental design, we explore these dynamics in the Korean context with MBA and MPA students enrolled in one of the country’s prominent universities.

We begin by reviewing the literature that directly informs performance appraisals, highlighting the roles of both task and non-task behaviors such as organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs). We then review some of the relevant literature on PSM, introducing the possibility that rater PSM may have an impact on an employee’s performance appraisal. We next describe our data and methods used to analyze those data. We conclude with a discussion of findings and their implications for research and practice.

PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS: TASK AND NON-TASK DETERMINANTS

Performance appraisal is an important responsibility for supervisors in organizations across all sectors. Organizational scholars have devoted considerable attention to explicating the job performance domain and determining what dimensions of performance are relevant to appraisal decisions (Borman and Motowidlo 1993; Katz and Kahn 1978). Two important dimensions of performance that have been considered are task performance and OCB. Task performance has been variously defined as behavior that is specified in a job description, that leads to the provision of a good or service, or that contributes to the technical core of the organization (Borman and Motowidlo 1993; Rotundo and Sackett 2002; Williams and Anderson
1991). These are the behaviors for which individuals are selected and hired, and the completion of such behaviors is quite naturally relevant to the appraisal of individual job performance. On the other hand, OCB has been defined as consisting of behaviors that support the “social and psychological environment in which task performance takes place” (Organ 1997).

Although these behaviors are generally considered to be more discretionary than task performance, a substantial amount of research has demonstrated that managers consider subordinate OCB when making their appraisal decisions and therefore seem to view OCB as an important part of job performance (Allen and Rush 1998; Borman and Motowidlo 1993; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter 1991; 1993; Motowidlo and Van Scotter 1994; Rotundo and Sackett 2002; Van Scotter and Motowidlo 1996; Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce 2008). In fact, task performance and OCB explain rather similar amounts of variance in appraisal decisions (Podsakoff et al. 2009).

Multiple dimensions of OCB have been proposed and investigated in the literature. However, for the purposes of this article, we focused on two dimensions that are particularly relevant to PSM: helping behavior and organizational loyalty. Helping behavior has been defined as “voluntarily helping others with, or preventing the occurrence of work-related problems” (Podsakoff et al. 2000, 516), and has been an important part of nearly every conceptualization of citizenship behavior appearing in the literature. Organizational loyalty has been defined as “identification with and allegiance to organizational leaders and the organization as a whole, transcending the parochial interests of individual, work groups, and departments” (Graham 1991, 255). Loyalty includes behaviors such as defending the organization against internal and external threats, and cooperating with others for the benefit of the organization. Given the relevance of these behaviors to PSM (to be discussed in greater detail) and that both varieties have been linked to performance appraisal decisions (Allen and Rush 1998; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter 1991; Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce 2008), we elected to focus the current research on these two dimensions.

Additionally, scholars working in this area have also explored a limited set of factors that might moderate the relationship between OCBs and performance appraisals. Largely focusing on characteristics of those being rated (“ratees”), several scholars have established that job position (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Paine 1999) and gender (Heilman and Chen 2005) moderate appraisals. For example, MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Paine (1999) observed that OCBs were more important to the evaluations of sales managers than sales people, and Heilman and Chen (2005) found that managers gave less credit to female employees for OCBs than to male employees.

Performance appraisal research focusing on raters has been heavily weighted toward issues of cognitive processing of information, involving rater knowledge of prior performance (Huber, Neale, and Northcraft 1987), the order in which good and poor performance was observed (Steiner and Rain 1989), and the role of memory decay (Kozlowski and Kirsch 1987). In addition, along the lines of research on “Pygmalion in the classroom” (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968) and self-fulfilling prophesies (Merton 1948), raters’ expectations appear to affect the rating process (Hogan 1987; Mount and Thompson 1987). For example, Hogan (1987) examined
the effect of supervisors’ expectations on their ratings of subordinates and found that when behaviors were incongruent with prior expectations, appraisal results appeared to lower ratings. Thus, raters’ personal traits and their individual cognitive process may affect the appraisal of employees.

Notwithstanding the rater’s importance to performance appraisals, few studies have explored the specific role that raters’ attributes may play in moderating the relationship between task and non-task behaviors and performance appraisals. Furthermore, despite the large number of U.S. studies on OCBs and performance appraisals, there is little agreement as to the applicability of OCBs in other cultures (Farh, Earley, and Lin 1997; Kim 2006; Paine and Organ 2000). In line with this point, this article is intended to investigate the moderating effect of raters’ characteristics on performance appraisals. Because of their relevance to OCBs, we focus on PSM.

PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION

Perry and Wise (1990, 368) defined PSM as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations” and developed measures of PSM, consisting of attraction to public policy, commitment to the public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice. Over the past two decades, a considerable number of PSM-related studies have focused on the relationship between PSM and “quality and content of public outputs” (Perry and Wise 1990, 369). Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise (2010) reviewed more than 100 empirical studies on PSM during the last two decades according to Perry and Wise’s (1990) three propositions. The first proposition, about the positive relationship between PSM and the likelihood of an individual selecting a public organization, has been widely supported (Lewis and Frank 2002; Rainey 1982; Vandenabeele 2008). With regard to the second proposition, which focused on the relationship between PSM and performance, some studies have found a positive impact of PSM on individual performance (Naff and Crum 1999; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Vandenabeele 2009), but others only found indirect effects (Bright 2007; Wright and Pandey 2008) or no significant relationship (Alonso and Lewis 2001). The third proposition, regarding the negative relationship between an individual’s PSM and the value or importance they place on monetary incentives, has been supported by many empirical studies (Bright 2005; 2009; Crewson 1997), while some studies showed no significant effects (Alonso and Lewis 2001; Frank and Lewis 2004).

As PSM research evolves, and researchers continue to identify antecedents, consequences, and correlates for PSM, we are mindful of some unresolved issues regarding the meaning and measurement of PSM. For example, traditional measures of PSM include a combination of values, beliefs, dispositions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions that complicates interpretation of PSM-related results. Certainly, much more research is needed to psychometrically validate PSM as a concept that can be distinguished from concepts such as altruism1 or prosocial motivation (Dovidio 1984; Grant 2008b; Wright, Christensen, and Pandey 2013).
However, this variety of measurement work is not the purpose of our manuscript. As such, it is important to clarify that our intended use of PSM is to capture something akin to an individual’s prosocial orientation or motivation. This has been defined as an individual’s desire to expend effort to benefit others, including the willingness to sacrifice their own needs to do so; prosocial motivation/orientation encompasses both a trait and a state of the employee (Grant 2008a; 2008b; Meglino and Korsgaard 2004; Perry et al. 2010). As a relatively stable trait, prosocial motivation reflects an individual’s disposition toward being empathetic and helpful (Penner et al. 2005), and expressing a concern for others (DeDreu 2006; Meglino and Korsgaard 2004). As we will discuss below, our chosen measure of PSM has demonstrated substantial conceptual and empirical equivalence (Wright, Christensen, and Pandey forthcoming) with established measures of prosocial motivation used in other disciplines (e.g., Grant 2008a).

The purpose of our research is to investigate how a manager’s PSM influences organizational practices, functioning, or outcomes (Wright 2007). One of the current shortcomings of the PSM literature is that it has not spent enough time discussing the behavioral implications of PSM among employees and managers. In this sense, this study focuses on the provision of performance appraisals as an important organizational practice. By understanding how PSM moderates the effect of OCBs on performance appraisals, we begin to construct a better understanding of how PSM is related to workplace behaviors. Additionally, this research provides a replication and extension of work reported by Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce (2008) to a different national setting (Korea) using a different population of interest (MBA and MPA students). Thus, we provide important information regarding the generalizability of their results, and the importance of PSM as a moderator of the relationships of interest.

The Moderating Effect of PSM on Task Behaviors

In their early work on PSM, Perry and Wise (1990) argued that individuals with higher levels of PSM would exhibit higher levels of work performance than their low PSM colleagues. Drawing on the job characteristics model (e.g., Fried and Ferris 1987; Hackman and Oldham 1976), they argued that employees with high levels of PSM are more likely to experience high levels of autonomy, task identity, and task significance. This, in turn, should lead them to find their jobs more motivating, resulting in improved levels of task performance. Consistent with this logic, empirical results have demonstrated that individuals who are high in PSM report higher levels of job satisfaction (Naff and Crum 1999) and an increased sense of the importance of their work (Wright and Davis 2003), both of which resulted in higher levels of job performance. We expect this emphasis on task performance for the self to extend to the manner in which high PSM managers view the performance of employees. That is to say, if managers who are high in PSM find their own work to be of substantial importance, they should similarly find the work of employees they supervise to be of great importance and, as a result, should weight task performance more heavily than their counterparts who are low in PSM. Interestingly, recent empirical evidence is supportive of this notion, demonstrating that PSM is correlated with a measure of the use of
performance-related information in decision making (Moynihan and Pandey 2010). Given this line of argument and the available empirical evidence, we hypothesize:

**H1:** PSM will moderate the relationship between task behaviors and performance appraisals, such that raters who are high in PSM will more heavily weight task behavior in their appraisal decisions.

While task behaviors are frequently considered to be non-discretionary work behaviors, in the following section we hypothesize how managerial PSM might moderate the appraisal of discretionary behaviors in the workplace.

**The Moderating Effect of PSM on OCBs**

Cognitive models of the performance appraisal process (DeNisi, Cafferty, and Meglino 1984; Feldman 1981) substantially inform how PSM might moderate the relationship between OCBs and performance appraisal decision. Feldman (1981) focused on the impact of both automatic and effortful cognitive processes on performance appraisals and the manner in which raters pay attention to, search for, and integrate performance information in making evaluative decisions. This theoretical model focuses on how schemata or implicit personality theories affect appraisals, with raters relying on a process of categorization efficiently to process large amounts of information, given limited cognitive resources. Raters classify stimulus objects as members of categories given the extent to which they possess the attributes of the category, and there are individual differences in the number, complexity, and nature of the categories or schemata that they use to classify stimulus objects.

Thus, managers might use these implicit personality theories to classify employees into relevant categories, such as a “good employee” or a “friendly” employee. The extent to which managers create and use such categories influences subsequent ratings of employees. Similarly, previous work (DeNisi, Cafferty, and Meglino 1984; Feldman 1981) found that job schemata would influence the manner in which job performance information is combined, weighted, and integrated in determining performance appraisal decisions.

In this study, we argue that raters’ PSM influences their perception of the importance of OCBs to performance appraisal decisions. We expect that raters who are high in PSM will view OCBs to be more important to ratings than those low in PSM.

Perry and Wise (1990) hypothesized early on that high levels of PSM are related to high levels of compassion and helpfulness towards others (particularly those perceived to be needy), high levels of commitment to a collective interest, and a willingness to sacrifice personal gain for the benefit of others. Subsequent studies have confirmed the behavioral manifestations implicit in many of these connections (Houston 2006; Brewer and Selden 1998; Clerkin, Paynter, and Taylor 2009; Wright, Christensen, and Isett forthcoming). For example, those with higher levels of PSM are more likely to donate money, time, and blood (instances of helping);
whistle-blow (instance of committing to collective interest); and embrace organizational change at their own expense (instance of self-sacrifice).

Based on the evidence in these studies and Kim’s (2006) survey of Korean civil servants in which he identified a strong relationship between PSM and OCBs, OCBs could be argued to be behavioral manifestations of public service motives in the workplace. For example, helping others in the workplace is a behavioral manifestation of compassion towards others, and a willingness to sacrifice personal gain for the benefit of others. Similarly, supporting and defending the organization against internal and external threats represents a behavioral manifestation of a commitment to a collective interest.

Managers who are themselves high in PSM are more likely to place greater weight on employee OCBs than their low-PSM counterparts for two primary reasons. First, these managers are more likely than those low in PSM to possess an implicit performance theory that employees who engage in OCBs fit the category of a “good employee.” Given that they themselves are high in PSM, they should view PSM to be more desirable from a normative point of view, and as such would be more likely to classify and categorize employees engaging in OCBs as good employees than those who are low in PSM. Second, managers who are high in PSM are more likely to view employees who engage in OCB to be similar to themselves in that they hold the same values as manifested by their behaviors. Such similarity is likely to lead to an increased sense of liking and personal affect for the employee in question (Lefkowitz 2000), which should subsequently increase the employee’s performance appraisal. For these reasons, we hypothesize:

H2a: PSM will moderate the relationship between OCBs and performance appraisals, such that raters who are high in PSM will more heavily weight helping behavior in their appraisal decisions.

H2b: PSM will moderate the relationship between OCBs and performance appraisals, such that raters who are high in PSM will more heavily weight loyalty behavior in their appraisal decisions.

The Korean Context

Korea has a substantially different culture and background of its civil service compared to the United States. To understand Korean civil servants’ behavior, it is necessary to understand some important features of the Korean public service. Cho and Im (2010) focused on Confucian values and collectivist cultures as distinct characteristics of Korea’s civil service. Confucian-oriented values have dominated in Korean society for centuries, so that Koreans have a tendency to think of themselves “as part of an organic whole that includes human society and the world around it, hierarchically arranged, related in a family-like pattern with eternally ordained responsibilities for everyone” (Macdonald 1996, 13). While the United States represents an individualistic Western society, Korea represents a collectivist culture that
emphasizes membership within groups and considers group over individual welfare (Hofstede 1991; Kim 2006; Paine and Organ 2000; Riordan and Christine 1994). Kim (2006, 724) presented these kinds of cultures as a “we-spirit” among Koreans, which means they consider their organization as a big family, their boss as a father or big brother, their co-workers as brothers and sisters, and their subordinates as sons and daughters; they usually use the words ‘our organization’ and ‘our department’; they emphasize interdependence and cooperation rather than competition; and they help each other to achieve our goals.

These generalizations notwithstanding, there are some distinctions between Korean public and private service that provide additional context. For example, Cho and Im (2010) characterize Korean bureaucracy as an arena of power struggle where civil servants frequently compete against others for power and resources. This reinforces Cameron and Quinn’s (1999) earlier observation supporting a view of the public sector as more hierarchical and competitive than the private sector, where the private sector actually captures more of the collectivist ideals.

Government service is highly revered in Korea. Many university graduates in Korea prefer public to private employment because the public sector is considered to impart more power and prestige, even augmenting one’s family’s reputation and stature. Passing the civil service entrance exam is envied as a great success. Thus many Koreans prefer being high civil servants to private company managers. Applied to our present study, there is evidence to suggest that Korean respondents might prioritize social relations over task-related performance in their organization, and the values of helping each other, loyalty to the organizations, and sacrificing personal interest for public good may be considered as the most important organizational values.

DATA AND METHODS

In addition to constructing a more complete understanding of the relationship among OCB, PSM, and employee performance appraisals, the study utilizes an experimental design. Traditionally, there has not been much experimental work within mainstream public administration scholarship. Recently, there have been calls for more experimental research designs, and more experimental work is appearing within the literature (e.g., Brewer 2011; James 2011; Moynihan 2006; Kelman 2007). Building on these recent suggestions, the work serves as a stepping-stone in advancing use of mixed-experimental methods in public administration.

Participants

We conducted an experiment using 101 MBA and MPA students at a prestigious Korean university. Half of the students were enrolled in an MBA program offered
through the business school, and the other half were enrolled in an MPA program. Forty-seven percent of participants were female, and the average participant age was 33. Of participants, 53% reported they were employed full time in addition to being students. The average reported length of full-time employment was 5.5 years, with 2.4 years in supervisory positions. Fifty-two percent of respondents either currently or previously had the responsibility to provide formal performance appraisals to subordinates at work. No significant difference in mean PSM scores was found between the MPA ($M = 4.83$, $SD = 0.10$) and MBA students ($M = 4.59$, $SD = 0.13$); $t(94) = -1.48$, $p = 0.07$.

Procedure

This study used a within-subjects “paper-people” design similar to the methodology employed by Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce (2008) to determine the impact of three job behaviors (task performance, helping behavior, and organizational loyalty) on performance appraisals. Each job behavior was manipulated at two levels (high and low performance), generating a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ within-subjects design. Using critical incidents of performance adapted from Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce (2008) to the Korean context, we generated short vignettes describing the job performance of eight different administrative assistants. Each short vignette included three critical incidents: one each for task, helping, and loyalty for a total of 24 critical incidents across the eight administrative assistants to be reviewed. Table 1 provides a summary of the conditions, the administrative assistants who were reviewed, as well as the mean and standard deviation of performance appraisal provided for each assistant.

For MBA students, the administrative assistants being reviewed were described as working for the financial director in a pharmaceutical company. For the MPA students, the administrative assistants being reviewed were described as working for the budget director of a local city government. Vignettes were randomly arranged, but were presented to the two samples in the same order. A full job description was provided to participants in the instructions. Sample incidents of task, helping and loyalty behavior are provided in Table 2. Measures translated from English to Korean were back-translated to English to ensure proper intent (Brislin 1970).

Manipulation Checks

Although the critical incidents used in this study were adapted from previously published work (Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce 2008), the extent to which the translated incidents are construct valid in a Korean context was not clear. As such, we conducted two manipulation check studies to determine the efficacy of our experimental manipulations. In the first study, we provided 30 Korean participants with the formal construct definitions of task performance, helping behavior, and organizational loyalty. We then provided these participants with all 24 critical incidents used in this study, and asked them to determine if the provided incident represented an example of task performance, helping, or loyalty (in a manner similar to a $Q$-sort). Results of
this study supported the efficacy of our manipulations in that participants reliably sorted incidents into their intended categories, with incidents being correctly classified at the following rates: task performance 75%, helping behavior 88%, and organizational loyalty 75%. In other words, the vast majority of the influence of these various manipulations did in fact operate via their intended construct.

In the second manipulation check study, we provided 30 different Korean participants with the formal definition of a construct, and then the eight critical incidents related to that construct. After reading each incident, we asked participants to rate the level of the construct demonstrated in the incident on a scale of 1 to 9, with a 1 representing a low amount of the construct and a 9 a high amount. Participants then completed this rating process for the two remaining constructs, in the end providing level ratings for each of the 24 critical incidents. Results of this study support the efficacy of our manipulations in two primary ways. First, for each construct (task, helping, loyalty) the data indicate that the high and low incidents are in fact viewed by participants as representing high and low levels of the defined construct. Mean figures for each manipulation level were as follows: high task \( M = 6.83 \); low task \( M = 2.95 \); high helping \( M = 6.93 \); low helping \( M = 2.89 \); high loyalty \( M = 6.38 \); low loyalty \( M = 3.83 \). The high manipulations were judged to be uniformly high, and the low manipulations were all viewed as representing a low level of the behavior in question. For each pair, \( t \) tests indicate that the high and low manipulations were significantly different (task \( t = 13.20 \) \([29]\); helping \( t = 14.55 \) \([29]\); loyalty \( t = 10.30 \) \([29]\); \( p < .001 \) in all cases). Second, the data from this study indicate that each of the three constructs was manipulated with relatively equivalent strength. That is to say, the means of the high incidents are rather similar across behavior types (high task = 6.83; high helping = 6.93; high loyalty = 6.38), as are those of the low incidents (low task = 2.95; low helping = 2.89; low loyalty = 3.83). Notably, loyalty demonstrates the smallest spread between the high and low manipulations, suggesting that loyalty was perhaps not manipulated as strongly as was task and helping. However,
considering the evidence from these studies together, we can have confidence in the construct validity of our manipulations in a Korean context.

**Measures**

*Performance Appraisal*

Once participants had finished reviewing the critical incidents, they completed a two-item overall performance appraisal measure adapted from MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter (1991) for each of the eight secretaries: “All things considered, this employee is outstanding” and “This employee is one of my best employees.” These items used a seven-point scale, indicating 1 as *strongly disagree* and 7 as *strongly agree*. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Low Example</th>
<th>High Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task</strong></td>
<td>I observed that Ra spent a lot of time on the phone today. Although she always seems to have time to talk to her family and friends on the phone, it often appears to be at the expense of getting her work completed.</td>
<td>Even though several financial analysts got their month-ending reports to Ba late, she was still able to integrate them and somehow got them to me on-time anyway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helping</strong></td>
<td>Even when Da could see that another secretary was overloaded with work on a particular day, she offered little in the way of assistance to help her complete the tasks, sticking instead to her own duties.</td>
<td>Ba had accumulated some time off by working lunches and staying late. She checked with me and the other secretaries about taking tomorrow off. When it appeared that tomorrow would be very busy, she changed her plans so the other secretaries wouldn’t be penalized by her absence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>behavior</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td>In the secretaries’ lounge, Ma overheard two friends discussing a recent rumor about the budget department. Even though Ma knew that the rumor was wrong she decided to say nothing to correct it, because she didn’t feel it was her responsibility to defend the budget department.</td>
<td>Even when rumors were circulating about a major oversight the budget department supposedly made, I heard Ba telling her friends that she just couldn’t believe the story was true, and that the department would be cleared of any wrong-doing in the end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>loyalty</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Public Service Motivation

Participants then completed questions to ascertain the respondent’s level of public service motivation. Our measure of PSM reflects a widely used (Naff and Crum 1999; Kim 2005; 2006; Wright and Pandey 2008; 2011; Wright, Moynihan, and Pandey 2012; Alonso and Lewis 2001; Brewer, Selden, and Facer 2000; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008), shortened version of Perry’s (1996) original 24-item scale, containing five items. The five items were as follows: “Meaningful public service is very important to me”; “Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements”; “I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another”; and “I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be ridiculed.” These items used a seven-point scale, anchored at 1 with strongly disagree and at 7 with strongly agree. The coefficient alpha for this measure was .75. We chose to measure PSM with these five items because the scale represents a widely used and accepted scale among PSM researchers, but also because this five-item measure has been shown to capture the more general construct of prosocial motivation. Recent research (Wright, Christensen, and Pandey 2013) using multiple data sets provides empirical evidence of the equivalency of this five-item PSM measure to measures of prosocial motivation used in the general management literature (Grant 2008a). As such, the use of this measure seemed particularly appropriate.

RESULTS

To analyze our data, we conducted a repeated measures ANCOVA with three within-subjects factors (task, helping, and loyalty) predicting performance appraisal ratings, and a single covariate (mean-centered rater PSM score) to analyze the moderating effect of PSM on the relationships between the job behaviors and performance appraisals. Table 3 provides the results of this analysis and the effect size estimates (partial $\eta^2$) for each main factor and each interaction.

As can be seen in Table 3, each of the three job behaviors was significantly related to performance appraisal ratings. Task performance was shown to have the largest effect (partial $\eta^2 = .78$), followed by helping (partial $\eta^2 = .60$) and loyalty (partial $\eta^2 = .41$). Rater PSM was also shown to have a significant direct effect on performance ratings (partial $\eta^2 = .41$).

Our hypotheses focus on how a rater’s PSM might moderate the appraisal of an employee’s task and non-task behaviors. A significant two-way interaction between rater PSM and task performance (partial $\eta^2 = .06$) lends empirical supports to our first hypothesis. Managers with higher levels of PSM gave more credit to employees who exhibited higher levels of task behavior. To better understand this conditional effect, we charted the interaction in Figure 1. To generate this figure, we divided our sample into two groups: those raters who reported high PSM scores (one standard deviation above the mean), and those raters who reported relatively lower PSM scores (one standard deviation below the mean). We then generated least-square
means of the performance ratings (i.e., the sum of the two performance appraisal items, where 2 indicates lowest performance and 14 highest performance) provided by these two groups when considering task performance. These least-square means are charted in Figure 1.

**TABLE 3**
ANCOVA Results: Performance Appraisals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Partial $\eta^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>330.11**</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping</td>
<td>139.02**</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>65.51**</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSM</td>
<td>5.22*</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task $\times$ Helping</td>
<td>38.50**</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task $\times$ Loyalty</td>
<td>8.11**</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task $\times$ PSM</td>
<td>6.32*</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping $\times$ Loyalty</td>
<td>25.94**</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping $\times$ PSM</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty $\times$ PSM</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task $\times$ Helping $\times$ Loyalty</td>
<td>7.17**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task $\times$ Helping $\times$ PSM</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task $\times$ Loyalty $\times$ PSM</td>
<td>4.80*</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping $\times$ Loyalty $\times$ PSM</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task $\times$ Helping $\times$ Loyalty $\times$ PSM</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Figure 1. Task $\times$ PSM Interaction Effect on Performance Appraisals.
As shown in Figure 1, raters both high and low in PSM evaluate employees who exhibit low task behavior quite similarly. However, raters high in PSM evaluate high task behavior more favorably than raters low in PSM.

Rater PSM did not condition the appraisal of either employee helping behavior or employee loyalty, thereby failing to provide direct support for H2a and H2b. However, the significant three-way interaction between rater PSM, task performance, and organizational loyalty does provide some important indirect information regarding H2b. To further understand this effect, we charted the interaction in Figure 2 using the same procedure employed to generate Figure 1.

As shown in Figure 2, raters who are high in PSM place more importance on loyalty behaviors when task performance is also high than raters who are low in PSM. Notably, lines with relatively flat slopes in this figure indicate that PSM did not affect the rating of employees with the performance profile in question (i.e., the combination of task performance and loyalty behavior), whereas lines with sharper slopes indicate that PSM did influence ratings. As can be seen, the two solid lines in this figure, for employees with high task performance, both show a positive slope, indicating that high PSM participants placed more emphasis on loyalty behavior when task performance was high than participants who were low in PSM. This further informs the significant two-way interaction of task performance and PSM to indicate that when task performance is high, high PSM respondents place greater weight on loyalty.

**DISCUSSION**

A large body of research has been conducted to explore the effects of PSM on a variety of job-related outcomes, such as job satisfaction, perception of red-tape,
commitment, as well as performance (Gabris 1995; Horton and Hondeghem 2006; Liu, Tang, and Zhu 2008; Scott and Pandey 2005). However, this is one of the first studies to examine the influence of rater, or managerial, PSM in performance appraisals.

To begin with, we found that rater PSM had a significant direct effect on performance appraisals in this study. This appears to indicate that individuals who are high in PSM might also possess a general leniency bias. Indeed, their interest in helping society and its institutions might extend to helping individuals they supervise by being lenient in their ratings. This is interesting, since it highlights that although PSM could be generally considered to be socially desirable, it might prove problematic in some managerial situations if those who are high in PSM are too lenient, and as a result do not provide accurate feedback to those they supervise. Additionally, this informs the notion that leniency biases might be predicted by individual difference variables (Kane et al. 1995), even though the small amount of empirical research on this topic to date has focused on the Big 5 personality dimensions, particularly conscientiousness and agreeableness (Bernardin, Cooke, and Villanova 2000; Randall and Sharples 2012; Yun et al. 2005).

Second, while others have evidenced a positive relationship between employee PSM and organizational performance, we offer here some of the first evidence that rater PSM moderates how a rater appraises employee performance in terms of task and non-task behaviors. To the former, we found support for our first hypothesis that raters who have higher levels of PSM will more heavily weight task behavior in their appraisal decisions. Interestingly, this interactive effect between rater PSM and employee task performance is slightly stronger than direct effect of PSM on a rater’s appraisal (partial $\eta^2 = .06$ versus partial $\eta^2 = .05$).

To the latter, although H2a and H2b were not formally supported, we found some evidence to suggest that PSM affects the manner in which task and non-task behaviors are collectively considered in appraisal decisions. Specifically, we found a three-way interaction between rater PSM, task performance, and organizational loyalty. This interaction demonstrated that when rater PSM is high (but not when low), high employee task performance increases the impact of employee loyalty on ratings. In other words, raters who were high in PSM placed greater weight on organizational loyalty when task performance was high than raters who were low in PSM.

Interestingly, some previous research has investigated the extent to which citizenship behaviors interact with task performance to influence appraisal decisions, with the argument being that citizenship behaviors will only have a positive effect on evaluations when task performance reaches some minimum level of proficiency (Kiker and Motowidlo 1999; Rotundo and Sackett 2002; Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce 2008). In other words, no amount of loyalty would result in a positive appraisal decision if task performance were not meeting a minimum threshold. However, research into such interactive effects has been inconsistent (Organ, Podsakoff, and MacKenzie 2006). One reason for these inconsistent findings could be that the characteristics of individual managers might influence the way in which they weight these various behaviors.
In our study, we found that employees who demonstrated both high levels of task performance and high levels of loyalty received higher evaluations only if the manager was also high in PSM. Thus, these interactive effects between various varieties of job performance (i.e., task and citizenship) might only emerge when raters possess given characteristics. Regarding PSM specifically, this finding is important since it demonstrates that the level of PSM that a manager possesses can affect the way in which they view and evaluate their own employees. That is to say, PSM matters not just to the attitudes and behaviors of the individual, but also to the manner in which they interpret and evaluate the behaviors of others.

Interestingly, our study was conducted in a Korean context. The majority of empirical work regarding both PSM (Kim et al. 2012) and the relationship between OCBs and performance appraisals has been on U.S.-based samples (Podsakoff et al. 2009), but our results point to the importance of these factors in a non-U.S. sample. Naturally, without further empirical evidence we cannot address the extent to which these results would generalize to other national contexts or settings, but we find it encouraging for PSM researchers that at least in this particular non-U.S. setting, we found that PSM had important implications for appraisal decisions.

Additionally, our results inform the generalizability of Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce’s (2008) work, which was conducted in a U.S. setting using undergraduate student participants. Specifically, we found a very similar pattern of results to those reported in Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce’s (2008) study 2, demonstrating that the task, helping, and loyalty manipulations were all significant predictors of appraisal decisions. Additionally, our study replicates their finding of a significant three-way interaction between task, helping, and loyalty behaviors. However, contrary to their results, our participants placed greater weight on helping than loyalty in determining their appraisals. Given that our study was conducted in a Korean setting, with participants who had substantially more work experience, this finding might indicate that the relative importance of various job-performance behaviors could vary based on national culture or work experience. Having said this, it does appear that the general pattern of results shown by Whiting, Podsakoff, and Pierce (2008) generalizes to a Korean context with graduate student participants.

Finally, this research has important implications for the study of OCB and performance appraisals. A fairly limited amount of previous research on performance appraisals has focused on rater traits and has primarily been interested in using rater traits to predict leniency. However, our study demonstrates that the trait of PSM influences how a rater views and interprets the behaviors of a ratee. To our knowledge, this represents one of the first investigations of this variety to determine how individual differences affect the manner in which a rater weights and evaluates employee behaviors.

**Implications for Future Research and Practice**

We believe the results of our studies have important implications for future research that go well beyond the typical recommendations for results to be replicated in different settings or with different methodologies. To begin with, we believe the
finding that rater PSM was directly related to performance ratings is a particularly interesting one that warrants further investigation. We have discussed here how rater-PSM might be tied to a leniency bias, and this seems like a notion that deserves further attention. Indeed, understanding how rater characteristics influence appraisals has been an important area of investigation, but it has been largely limited to an investigation of the Big 5 personality dimensions. Determining not just the extent to which this result is replicable, but also the extent of the leniency present, is an important area for researchers in public management to address.

Perhaps of greater note is that we have expanded upon the research positively linking PSM and job performance. In particular, even controlling for PSM's direct effect on performance appraisals, we found that raters with higher levels of PSM gave higher appraisals to employees exhibiting high task performance. In the midst of calls for public service employees and organizations to be more task- and performance-oriented, we find this to be strong evidence of the priority that raters with high levels of PSM ascribe to task performance.

Although the results of our study suggest that rater-PSM is related to the value that a rater will place on OCBs in making their appraisal decisions, our study cannot answer the question of why this is the case. As such, we believe that future research should investigate the mediating processes that explain this relationship, and should be particularly aware of the extent to which PSM might moderate these mediated relationships (Edwards and Lambert 2007). Investigations into these mediating processes should hopefully inform why those who are high in PSM place greater weight on OCBs in making appraisal decisions.

Finally, we argue that this research has important practical implications, particularly to managers of public organizations or any organization that might attract individuals who are high in PSM (Leisnik and Steijn 2008; Steen 2008; Christensen and Wright 2011). Indeed, if PSM is tied to rating leniency and to the manner in which supervisors weight various job-related behaviors in making their appraisal decisions, this might have a profound impact on the effectiveness and perceived fairness of appraisal systems in these organizations. A general tendency toward leniency might be problematic in such settings, given the importance of ratings accuracy in public sector and public service institutions and the stewardship that such organizations have toward their stakeholders to provide the best services possible with the resources they’ve been allocated. When ratings are inflated and raters are too lenient, it is difficult for organizations to obtain meaningful performance information with which to make personnel decisions. This could lead to significant difficulty in making such organizational decisions as who to promote, provide with pay raises, provide additional training to, and in some cases to terminate.

Beyond this general leniency, however, rater PSM seems to have a slightly stronger moderating impact on task performance appraisals. This suggests that for employees working for managers with high public service motives nondiscretionary task behaviors may be particularly crucial. Inasmuch as sector is a proxy for PSM (and we recognize the imperfection of this proxy), public sector employees may need to be particularly task-oriented.
While we found some evidence (see Figure 2) of the importance of loyalty (a discretionary OCB) in conjunction with task behaviors and rater PSM, if managers over-emphasize citizenship behaviors in their appraisal decisions, this might be viewed as unfair or unjust by employees. Notably, perceptions of justice are tied to a number of very important job attitudes and behaviors (Colquitt et al. 2001), and if employees feel like their evaluations are unfair or are not representative of their task performance, this might cause difficulties in terms of fairness perceptions. This could be the case even though citizenship behaviors have been shown to be tied to “bottom-line” organizational results (Podsakoff et al. 2009). If employees are not aware that their managers value such behaviors and will weight them in their appraisal decisions, this could lead to substantial problems in terms of perceptions of fairness.

Limitations

As with any empirical investigation, this study has several limitations that should be noted. First of all, this study used a laboratory “paper-people” methodology. As is often the case, the use of such an experimental methodology allows for greater control of the dependent variables, and facilitates fairly strong inferences regarding internal validity. However, these advantages are counterweighted with the disadvantages of laboratory investigations. Raters in our study were evaluating fictional target employees, and as such had no real interest or motive in their rating approach. Notably, previous research has shown that appraisals in real organizations can be heavily influenced by whether or not the rater expects to interact with the ratee in the future, as well as the goals of the rater in terms of providing feedback to an employee or generating a rating that can serve to form administrative decisions (Murphy and Cleveland 1995). That is to say, appraisals in real organizations have concrete consequences for both the rater and the ratee, and these consequences are absent in a lab study such as this one. As such, it is not clear the extent to which our findings would generalize to real organizational settings. Additionally, it is unclear at this point whether or not our findings would generalize to a non-Korean work setting.

CONCLUSION

Despite these limitations, we believe our work represents an important starting point to investigating the manner in which PSM affects the performance appraisal process in public sector and public service institutions. We found that rater PSM was related to leniency in performance ratings, but that despite this general leniency, raters who are high in PSM will more heavily weight task behavior in their appraisal decisions.

NOTE

1. We note, however, that theoretical attempts to distinguish PSM are not new, and that the idea of PSM as a distinct concept stems, in part, from critiques (Perry and Porter 1982; Shamir 1991) that classic theories of motivation—presumably including altruistic motivation (e.g., Rushton, Chrisjohn, and Fekken 1981)—paid too much attention to rational,
self-centered dynamics, and too little attention to prosocial and institutions-conscious dynamics (Perry 2000). Despite an early desire to distinguish PSM from then extant concepts, Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise (2010, 681–682), in a 20-year review of the PSM literature, underscore that altruism and prosocial motivation remain closely related to PSM. This confirms early PSM work that accepted shared conceptual space with altruistic motivation. (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999).

REFERENCES


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